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Abstract. This study presents evidence of the influence of gender diversity on the pay sys-
tem and the monitoring of executives in Spain. In this country/context, characterized by a 
few male dominant shareholders acting simultaneously as executives, there is an ongoing 
discussion regarding the enactment of laws to promote gender equality on the boards of 
directors of large listed companies. This paper presents several contributions. On the one 
hand, the scarce previous evidence on this topic is focused on US firms. On the other 
hand, this study includes the role of ownership structure as a factor that indirectly moder-
ates the relationships between gender diversity on board and monitoring effectiveness in 
terms of executive directors’ compensation. Furthermore, this paper makes an important 
effort to control endogeneity. The sample examined includes 120 companies listed on 
the Spanish stock market during the period 2004–2011. The results show a positive and 
highly significant effect of the presence of women independent directors on the propor-
tion of variable pay in the compensation of executive directors. Our findings also point 
out the negative moderating effect of ownership concentration: the more concentrated is 
ownership in the hands of internal majority shareholder, the less is the link between board 
diversity and pay-for-performance systems. 
Keywords: executive compensation, gender diversity, board of directors, ownership struc-
ture, agency theory, institutional context, Spanish listed firms.
JEL Classification: G34, J16, J31.
Introduction
In developed countries, the increasing presence of women in the labour market is lead-
ing to changes in corporate structures and the functioning of businesses. However, a 
similar change has not occurred in all of them and, nowadays, Spain is one of the coun-
tries with the lowest proportion of women directors in the European Union (Heidrick, 
Struggles 2011; Mateos de Cabo et al. 2011). To correct this situation, the Spanish 
1134
J. S. Baixauli-Soler et al. Executive directors’ compensation and monitoring: the influence of gender ...
Government has made a series of legislative changes in recent years. In 2006 the 
Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores, CNMV (the Spanish equivalent to the 
American SEC) introduced the Código Unificado de Buen Gobierno [Unified Good 
Governance Code], that recommends that boards reflect gender diversity. Ley Organica 
(2007) Igualdad Efectiva de Mujeres y Hombres [Gender Equality Act], imitating 2003 
Norwegian norms, suggests – just as a recommendation – that at least 40% of directors 
be women by 2015. Recently, Ley Organica (2011) Economia Sostenible [Sustainable 
Economy Act] promote gender equality in boards of public administration, public ser-
vices and public universities.
Several studies have analysed the direct effect of gender diversity on boards in terms 
of corporate performance (Krishnan, Park 2005; Dezso, Ross 2012; Mahadeo et al. 
2012) but little attention has been paid to the influence of women directors through the 
process of monitoring and compensation of executives (Adams, Ferreira 2009). From 
an agency theory viewpoint, diversity in a board of directors may favour the alignment 
of interests between owners and executives (Hillman, Dalziel 2003; Bear et al. 2010), 
promoting greater monitoring through the design of executives’ compensation linked 
to firm performance, which would encourage executives to maximise the company’s 
value (Devers et al. 2007). 
However, the particular context of corporate governance may alter the general assump-
tions of agency theory. In the case of Spanish listed firms, representative of Continental 
European countries, the ownership structure is highly concentrated in the hands of a 
few majority shareholders and the differentiation between directors and executives is 
much more reduced. Directors are, in most cases, direct representatives of the control-
ling shareholders which used to act as executives as well (La Porta et al. 1999; Leech, 
Manjon 2002). Thus, this corporate governance context represents from an agency 
view a principal-principal conflict (Johnson et al. 2000; Young et al. 2008; Van Buren 
III 2010), where the internal majority shareholders may have both the incentives and 
power to connive with executives, “tunneling” wealth of minority shareholders through 
compensation – fixed salaries not linked to company performance – or related party 
transactions (Morck et al. 2005). 
This situation may affect the influence of gender diversity on the supervisory effec-
tiveness of the boards of Spanish listed firms. Considering the characteristics of the 
ownership structure and the type of control in Spanish listed firms, the presence of 
independent women directors could significantly improve the effectiveness of board 
that, at the end, determine the design of executive directors’ compensation. Since gender 
diversity on boards is positively associated with better monitoring and decision-making 
(Daily, Dalton 2003; Terjesen et al. 2009; Nielsen, Huse 2010; Jurkus et al. 2011), in a 
context of poor corporate governance, and increasing presence of independent women 
directors encourage the implementation of pay-for-performance systems for executive 
directors that contribute to the alignment of interests and minimization of agency cost 
(Conyon, He 2011).
Thus, the main objective of this paper is, considering ownership structure as a moder-
ating factor of corporate governance, to examine the extent to which gender diversity 
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on boards of directors may influence the effectiveness of their supervision in terms of 
executive directors’ compensation design as a mechanism favouring the alignment of 
interests, analysing a Spanish panel data for the period 2004–2011. Several specific con-
tributions are produced by this research. First, previous evidence on this topic is scarce 
and mostly focused on US firms. This study makes it possible to understand these rela-
tionships in a very different context of corporate governance, contributing to the grow-
ing number of country-specific studies by providing original empirical evidence from 
the Spanish case (Adams, Ferreira 2009). Second, considering the specific context of 
corporate governance, this study includes the role of ownership structure as a factor that 
indirectly moderate the relationships between gender diversity on board and monitoring 
effectiveness in terms of executive directors’ compensation. It is important to consider 
ownership as a moderator especially in non-Anglo-Saxon countries, where the level of 
concentration in a few majority shareholders may change the nature of potential con-
flicts inside the companies, highlighting the role of executive directors to the detriment 
of non-directors’ executives (Baixauli-Soler, Sanchez-Marin 2011, 2015). Furthermore, 
in the empirical side, this paper has an important effort in order to effectively control 
the endogeneity problems using System GMM since causality between board gender 
diversity and executive director’s variable compensation runs in both directions.
In order to carry out this research, a thorough review of the theory of principal-principal 
conflict was conducted, with specific reference to gender diversity, board effectiveness, 
and executive directors’ compensation. This review is reported in the first section. After 
that, the sample, variables and methodology used are described in the second section. 
The main results are set out in the third section, and, finally, the main conclusions and 
the discussion are showed.
1. Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
Agency theory argues that, given the information available and the preferences of prin-
cipals and agents, the optimal compensation contract that governs the rewards of execu-
tives is one that links compensation to the economic value of company (Jensen, Murphy 
1990; Devers et al. 2007)1. But the literature goes beyond the strict boundaries of the 
contract, examining supervisory relationships between owners and executives, and their 
1 Agency theory does not provide a clear prediction for the correlation of executives’ compensation 
and firm performance (Gomez-Mejia, Wiseman 1997; Devers et al. 2007). On one hand, there is a 
“dark side” of incentives, under normative predictions of agency theory when variable compensation 
reached a high proportion in terms of total compensation affect negatively executives’ behaviors and, 
ultimately, firm performance (Mayer 2013). On the other hand, we can also assume the arguments of 
agency theory in its positive stream, which predict that starting from low levels of variable pay – as 
it is the most usual in the compensation package of listed firms- pay-for-performance systems con-
tribute positively to firm performance. This interesting and complex debate is unresolved to date – 
see, for example, excellent review of Devers et al. (2007), surpassing the scope and the objective of 
this paper. Nevertheless, considering that in our study approximately the variable pay of executive 
directors only reached 24.4% of total pay, we assume that an increase of proportion of variable pay 
improves the monitoring of executives, aligning the principals-agents interests, and reporting positive 
effects in terms of firm performance. 
1136
J. S. Baixauli-Soler et al. Executive directors’ compensation and monitoring: the influence of gender ...
social interactions within the corporate governance of organizations (Gomez-Mejia, 
Wiseman 1997). The characteristics of the ownership structure and the board of direc-
tors of the company have been the two basic mechanisms related to the ability to moni-
tor executives and, therefore, related to the design of adequate compensation packages 
(Khan et al. 2005; Kumar, Sivaramakrishnan 2008; Dalton, D. R., Dalton, C. M. 2011).
Studies have attempted to determine how the specific context of corporate governance – 
in the presence of certain conditions of both the board of directors and the ownership 
structure – influence the optimal compensation schemes that maximize the value of 
the company. For instance, Spanish listed companies represent a system of corporate 
governance typical of continental European countries, characterized by a highly con-
centrated ownership in the hands of a few controlling shareholders, widespread property 
conflicts between dominant shareholders, slow change in the ownership of blocks of 
shares that confer control, and a reduced market for corporate control due to the low 
level of development of capital markets (La Porta et al. 1999). To this must be added 
the lack of protection the law gives minority shareholders who have no ability to control 
and the presence of non-dual organic structures, in which a single board simultaneously 
performs supervision and direction (La Porta et al. 1999; Leech, Manjon 2002).
Thus, the main problem affecting the design of the executives’ compensation is not the 
principal-agent conflict that has developed in Anglo-Saxon firms from the perspective 
of the hypothesis of managerial power, which analyses the possible expropriation of 
rents by executives through their influence on the design of their own compensation 
(Bebchuk et al. 2002). In Spain arises a potential principal-principal conflict in which 
dominant shareholders control the board of directors (Johnson et al. 2000; Morck et al. 
2005; Young et al. 2008). Although these majority shareholders have the incentive and 
the power to supervise and influence executives through a proper design of their com-
pensation, they also have the moral hazard of entering into collusion with the execu-
tives even appoint themselves as executive directors, setting high pay levels not linked 
to company performance, producing a potential expropriation of minority shareholders 
(Conyon, He 2011). Therefore, the following arguments for our hypotheses consider 
these assumptions as a way of analysing the position and role of women on Spanish 
boards in setting executive directors’ compensation.
1.1. Gender diversity and board of directors
The board of directors is responsible for supervising and validating most important 
corporate decisions, among which it is the design of executives’ pay packages. Board 
of directors links compensation to company performance to encourage executives to 
achieve corporate goals. Achieving effective supervision depend basically on the inde-
pendence of the board of directors regarding the balance between internal and external 
board members (Higgs 2003; Hillman, Dalziel 2003; Dalton D. R., Dalton C. M. 2011; 
Kulich et al. 2011). There is a general consensus in the literature that a higher percent-
age of independent directors – both in boards and in compensation committees – favour 
more effective supervision and a greater ability to design compensation packages that 
aligns the interests of executives with those of the owners (Conyon, He 2004; Brick 
et al. 2006; Sapp 2008).
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There has also been a great interest in investigating the way in which the presence 
of women as independent directors may favour the monitoring of executives direc-
tors. Globally, literature shows that women professionalism and additional qualities 
can provide the necessary independence to the board of directors and compensation 
committees (Hillman, Dalziel 2003; Adams, Ferreira 2009) to rightly monitor, evaluate 
and compensate executives, guiding their efforts to achieve the company’s objectives 
(Daily, Dalton 2003; Bear et al. 2010). Several reasons are behind this affirmation. First, 
women tend to show a greater willingness to work together and collaborate on conflict 
resolution, promoting effective communication between boards of directors and interest 
groups (Kramer et al. 2006; Konrad et al. 2008). Second, they also tend to participate 
actively in meetings through comprehensive and effective planning concerning the is-
sues to be dealt with (Izraeli 2000). And third, they raise complex issues regarding the 
future of the company that require more detailed, concise and planned answers, correct-
ing information biases both in the formulation of strategies for companies and in the 
resolution of important problems (Westphal, Milton 2000). In addition, literature also 
demonstrate that gender diversity incorporates demographic differences on the boards 
that are crucial to exercise a more global and independent monitoring of executives, 
helping to reduce agency costs and increasing the company value (Adams, Ferreira 
2009; Nielsen, Huse 2010).
Although these relationships have been confirmed for US firms (Adams, Ferreira 2009), 
in the case of Spanish listed firms the situation concerning women on boards is quite 
distinct because of the institutional context of corporate governance. In general, Mateos 
de Cabo et al. (2011) find evidence of several source of discrimination behind the scarce 
presence and proportion of independent women on Spanish boards of directors. Addi-
tionally to this masculinity of the Spanish boards, Sanchez-Marin et al. (2010) find that 
the executives’ compensation is more strongly influenced by the social interactions be-
tween directors and executives than by economic and market factors, as a consequence 
of the high number of directors with strong relationships with the management of the 
firm, and the weak influence of independent directors on compensation committees. As 
Baixauli-Soler and Sanchez-Marin (2011, 2015) state, boards tend to be more interested 
in improving their legitimacy than in relating executives’ compensation to firm perfor-
mance, encouraging rent extraction through executives’ pay at the expense of minority 
shareholders. Spanish executives will be more likely to secure increases in their pay 
levels through the boards of directors, as a consequence of the great importance of social 
comparison and legitimacy factors for business relations.
In this situation, gender diversity, in the form of independent women in boards or 
compensation committees, may compensate for the low effective monitoring of Span-
ish boards. Since gender diversity is associated with a greater diversity of knowledge 
and skills, as well as a variety of appropriate criteria for making decisions (Terjesen 
et al. 2009; Nielsen, Huse 2010; Jurkus et al. 2011), one might expect gender diversity 
to produce better information and supervision of executive directors (Daily, Dalton 
2003; Bear et al. 2010), and an increased tendency to establish a compensation design 
1138
J. S. Baixauli-Soler et al. Executive directors’ compensation and monitoring: the influence of gender ...
more closely linked to firm performance. Thus, starting from theses basis, a board will 
be more effective in its monitoring if the number of independent women, either in the 
boardroom or on the compensation committee, is greater.
H1: Gender diversity in the composition of the board of directors (in the role of inde-
pendents) leads to a greater proportion of executive directors’ compensation linked 
to firm performance.
1.2. The moderating role of ownership structure
The expected relationship in Hypothesis 1 may have different pathways in Spanish 
context depending on the ownership structure of firms. Empirical evidence generally 
supports the view that, when ownership is concentrated, executives are better monitored 
and the compensation they receive are more closely linked to company performance 
(Werner et al. 2005), as it can also allow for the specialization necessary to develop 
complex organizational structures and distribute the risk appropriately among execu-
tives and owners. However, the alleged positive relationship between concentration of 
ownership and executives’ monitoring is not always synonymous with an alignment of 
interests: the owners’ ability and incentive to supervise will determine the effectiveness 
of monitoring and rewarding executives (Shleifer, Vishny 1997).
Unlike the US context, where more dispersed ownership structures have been reported 
(La Porta et al. 1999; Leech, Manjon 2002), studies in Spanish listed companies reflect 
a highly concentrated ownership structure, with a few internal dominant sharehold-
ers. For instance, these studies show that the largest shareholder holds around 36% of 
the stock, and the top three shareholders hold around 50%, highlighting that firms are 
mainly dominated by (internal) individuals, companies and families, while (external) 
institutional investors control only 15% of firms, which is typical of countries with weak 
legal protection for minority shareholder interests. Thus, in Spanish listed companies 
we can find companies mainly controlled by internal majority shareholders (individuals, 
firms and families), who usually combine the roles of executives with those of directors 
on the board (Sanchez-Marin et al. 2010). That scenario, on which these controlling 
shareholders serve as “entrenched” executives with enough power to control the board, 
results in increases of expropriation of minority shareholders’ wealth – or tunnelling – 
through related party transactions and/or compensation. The effectiveness of monitoring, 
whether through the board or directly through controlling shareholders, is most unlikely 
and therefore executives directors’ compensation tends to be higher, fixed and barely 
linked to company performance (Baixauli-Soler, Sanchez-Marin 2011, 2015).
In this framework, the presence of independent women directors, that may balance 
the low monitoring effectiveness of firms controlled by internal majority shareholders 
as reported above, may be difficult by the internal majority shareholder. Women act-
ing as professional experts as well as a factor of demographic diversity to provide the 
necessary quality and independence to the board of directors to monitor, evaluate and 
compensate executives (Daily, Dalton 2003; Hillman, Dalziel 2003; Bear et al. 2010) 
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might be a threaten for dominant shareholders and executives. If literature’s findings 
specifically indicate that their presence on the board’s decision-making can guide the 
efforts of executives to achieve the objectives of the company through the establishment 
of compensation related to firm performance, gender diversity may diminish the prob-
ability of tunnelling (Adams, Ferreira 2009). Therefore, in the context of Spanish listed 
firms, it is to be expected a negative moderating role of ownership concentration in the 
hands of internal majority shareholders: the more is the concentration of ownership, 
the less is the relationships between gender diversity – in form of independent women 
either in the board or in the compensation committee – and the design of compensation 
linked to company performance.
H2: Ownership concentration negatively moderates the relationship between gender 
diversity and executive directors’ compensation: a higher ownership concentration 
reduces the positive links between independent women on the board and executive 
directors’ compensation linked to firm performance.
2. Sample, data and methodology
The sample includes 120 companies listed on the Spanish stock market during the pe-
riod 2004–2011 which do not belong to the financial sector. The total number of obser-
vations was 826. Governance reports of listed firms were obtained from the Comisión 
Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV). From those reports, the information about 
the compensation of executive directors and board characteristics were collected. The 
information about economic-financial variables was obtained from the SABI database 
(System of Analysis of Iberian Balance Sheets, provided by Bureau Van Dijk).
Definition and descriptive statistics of the variables are shown in Table 1. The depend-
ent variable, compensation linked to performance, has been measured by the variable 
pay obtained from governance reports. The variable pay of executive directors reported 
is the component of the compensation package that consists on annual bonus which 
is considered short-term compensation. The variable pay included in the governance 
reports does not contain long-term compensation (stock options, stocks or pension ben-
efits). Following Adams and Ferreira (2009), the variable (VAR_PAY) is calculated as 
the logarithmic transformation of the proportion of variable pay to total compensation 
received by board members: 
 _ __ log ,
1 _ _
PER VAR PAYVAR PAY
PER VAR PAY
 
= + µ − 
where µ is a very small number. The firms’ reports of corporate governance do not 
provide the details of the compensation received by each manager. Thus, it is logical to 
assume that the fixed and variable pay applies primarily to executive directors, given 
that external directors usually receive only benefits and perks. 
Gender diversity has been measured by three measures at firm level (PER_WOM_BOA, 
BLAU, SHANNON) and two at board composition level (PER_IND_WOM, NUM_
WOM_MEE).
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Percentage of variable pay, calculated as 
amount of the variable as a proportion of 
total compensation, expressed on a per 
unit basis. The logarithmic transformation 
of this variable is included as dependent 
variable, according with this equation:
VAR_PAY =
 
_ __ log .
1 _ _
PER VAR PAYVAR PAY
PER VAR PAY
 
= + µ − 
0.244 0.179 0.256 0.000 0.910
Gender variables
PER_ WOM_BOA
Percentage of women on the board of 
directors, calculated as total number of 
female directors divided by total number 
of directors, expressed on a per unit basis.
0.057 0.000 0.082 0.000 0.444
BLAU
Blau diversity index, calculated as 
2
1
1 n ii P=−∑ , where Pi refers to the 
percentage of female board members, 
expressed on a per unit basis.
0.095 0.000 0.125 0.000 0.493
SHANNON
Blau diversity index, calculated as 
1
lnn i ii P P=−∑ , where Pi refers to the 
percentage of female board members,  
expressed on a per unit basis.
0.159 0.000 0.200h 0.000 0.686
PER_IND_WOM
Percentage of female independent board 
members, calculated as the total number 
of independent women on the board di-
vided by the total number of female di-
rectors, expressed on a per unit basis.
0.024 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.444
Board of Directors characteristics
PER_ EXT_DIR
Percentage of external directors on the 
board, calculated as total number of exter-
nal directors divided by the total number 
of directors, expressed on a per unit basis.
0.794 0.806 0.131 0.250 1.000
DUAL
Duality, calculated as a binary variable 
that takes a value of 1 when the same 
person occupies the roles of CEO and 
Chairman of the board and 0 otherwise.
0.583 1.000 0.493 0.000 1.000
NUM_DIR Number of directors on the board. 11.008 10.000 3.717 5.000 24.000
NUM_MEE Number of meetings held annually by the compensation committee. 4.264 4.000 2.919 0.000 20.000
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Ownership and type of control
OWN_FIV_SHA The sum of ownership for the top five shareholders, expressed on a per unit basis. 0.454 0.430 0.263 0.010 0.997
FAM_DUM
Binary variable that takes a value of 1 
when the main shareholder is an individ-
ual or family member and zero otherwise.
0.279 0.000 0.324 0.000 1.000
COR_DUM
Binary variable that takes a value of 1 
when the main shareholder is a corpora-
tion and zero otherwise.
0.367 0.000 0.476 0.000 1.000
INS_DUM
Binary variable that takes a value of 
1 when the main shareholder is an 
institution and zero otherwise.
0.350 0.000 0.480 0.000 1.000
Firm characteristics
TOBIN_Q
Approximation of Tobin’s Q, calculated 
as total debt plus market value of equity 
divided by total assets, in Euros.
2.275 2.392 1.004 0.117 5.951
ROA
Return on assets, calculated as earnings 
before interest and taxes divided by total 
assets, expressed on a per unit basis.
0.032 0.035 0.171 -1.879 1.141
STAN_DES Standard deviation of market return, cal-culated as the annual volatility of returns. 0.076 0.023 0.560 0.000 11.280
DIVER
Firm business diversification, calculated 
and the number of different secondary 
SIC codes.
2.567 2.000 1.930 1.000 10.000
DEBT Debt ratio, calculated as total debt di-vided by total assets, in so much per one. 0.535 0.564 0.244 0.004 1.000
SIZE Firm size, measured as the logarithm of total assets, in Euros. 13.340 13.185 1.878 6.737 18.349
First at firm level, gender diversity was measured by the percentage of women on 
the board of directors, (PER_WOM_BOA), calculated as the number of women board 
members divided by the total number of directors. Given the characteristics of our sam-
ple, where the minimum and maximum value for the percentage of women directors is 
at the level of 0% and 44%, the larger values of the variable the larger heterogeneity on 
the board. Two other variables have been employed to measure diversity at firm level. 
The Blau diversity index, (BLAU), vary between 0 and 0.5, at which there is the same 
percentage of male and female board members and thus the diversity is maximised. The 
Shannon diversity index, (SHANNON), vary between 0 and 0.69, the latter figure cor-
End of Table 1
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responding to the greatest possible degree of diversity. These two indexes are frequently 
used as proxies for gender diversity (Stirling 1998; Harrison, Klein 2007).
Second at board level, we measure gender diversity in the role of independent by the 
percentage of independent women on the board of directors, (PER_IND_WOM), and 
the presence in the compensation committee by the number of women, (NUM_WOM_
MEE).
As control variables related to compensation design we considered three dimensions: 
board characteristics, ownership structure and firm characteristics. To measure board 
characteristics, which include the effectiveness and independence of the board of di-
rectors, several variables have been employed: (1) size of the board, (NUM_DIR), 
measured by the number of board members; (2) composition, which considers the pro-
portion of external directors, (PER_ EXT_DIR), computed as the external board mem-
bers divided by the size of the board; and (3) structure, which considers the duality in 
management through the dummy variable (DUAL), which takes the value 1 when the 
same person occupies the roles of CEO and chairman of the board and 0 otherwise. We 
also consider the number of meetings held annually by the compensation committee, as 
a measure of board effectiveness, (NUM_MEE). 
Focusing on the ownership concentration in the hands of a few dominant shareholders 
we included the stock held by the five largest shareholders, (OWN_FIV_SHA), meas-
ured by the percentage of shares owned. We also control the identity of the controlling 
shareholder with two binary dummies that takes a value of 1 when the main shareholder 
is an individual/families (FAM_DUM) and when is other company (COR_DUM).
Finally, six variables describing firm characteristics were included which could sig-
nificantly influence compensation design. These covered matters relating to the size, 
performance, growth opportunities and leverage of the firm as well as the level of diver-
sification and risk of its business activities. Specifically, these variables were firm size, 
(SIZE), measured by the logarithm of total corporate assets; firm performance, (ROA), 
measured by dividing net income by total assets; growth opportunities, (TOBIN_Q), 
measured by the Tobin’s Q, calculated as the market value of equity plus the book 
value of debt divided by book value of assets; firm leverage, (DEBT), measured as 
total debt divided by total assets; business diversification, (DIVER), defined as the 
number of four-digit SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) codes; and firm volatility, 
(STAN_DES), measured as the annual volatility of returns.
According to the sample characteristics, we have to highlight that the percentage of 
women on boards of directors is very low, an average of 5.7%. However, there has been 
a significant change since 2004, the starting year of our sample, when the number of 
female board members stood at just over 2% moving to almost an 8.2% in 2011. 
Regarding independent board members, the percentage of independent female directors 
is 2.4%. With regard to compensation, only 24.4% is variable, and thus tied to results. 
It is also noteworthy that more than 79% of board members are external, complying 
with the Código Unificado de Buen Gobierno (2006) recommendation. Finally, in 58% 
1143
Journal of Business Economics and Management, 2016, 17(6): 1133–1154
of the companies, the position of CEO and chairman of the board are occupied by the 
same person and 87% of boards comply with the recommendation of the Código Unifi-
cado de Buen Gobierno (2006) on the number of board members being between 5 and 
15. The percentage of companies with compensation committees increases from 75% 
in 2004 to 97% in 2011.
We have specified two econometric models for estimation. Equation (1) summarise the 
first panel data model: 
, 0 , 1 , 2 ,
3 , 4 , 5 ,
6 , 7 , 8 , 9 ,
10 , 11 , 12 , 13
_ _ _
_ _ _ _
_ _ _
_
i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t
VAR PAY GENDER PER EXT DIR DUAL
NUM DIR NUM MEE OWN FIV SHA
FAM DUM COR DUM TOBIN Q ROA
STAN DES DIVER DEBT SIZ
= α + β ⋅ + β ⋅ + β ⋅ +
β ⋅ + β ⋅ + β ⋅ +
β ⋅ + β ⋅ + β ⋅ + β ⋅ +
β ⋅ + β ⋅ + β ⋅ + β , , ,i t t i i tE + ψ + η + ε  
(1)
where ψt, ηi and eit represent the temporal effects by mean of dummy variables, indi-
vidual effects and the random disturbance, respectively. GENDER represents the per-
centage of women on the board, the Shannon and Blau diversity indexes. As gender 
diversity measures show high correlation they have been included in the regressions 
alternatively. Finally, we include all measures of ownership, board and firm character-
istics considered.
Equation (1) allows the estimation of the main effects of gender diversity, similar to 
Adams and Ferreira (2009), but in a different institutional context. According to Hy-
pothesis 1, we expect that β0 is positive in Equation (1). To examine the two proposed 
hypotheses, that is the influence of gender diversity as independent or as compensation 
committee member as well as obtaining a marginal effect of gender diversity related 
to ownership concentration, we estimate Equation 2, which includes GENDER which 
represents the percentage of independent board members and the number of female 
board members on the compensation committee. According to Hypothesis 2, we expect 
that β1 is negative in Equation (2):
( ), 0 1 , 2 , 3 ,
, 4 , 5 , 6 ,
7 , 8 , 9 , 10 ,
11 , 12 ,
_  _ _ _ _
_ _ _
_ _ _ _ _
_
i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
i t i t
VAR PAY OWN FIV SHA DUM FAM DUM COR
GENDER PER EXT DIR DUAL NUM DIR
NUM MEE OWN FIV SHA FAM DUM COR DUM
TOBIN Q ROA
= α + β + β ⋅ + β ⋅ + β ⋅
+ β ⋅ + β ⋅ + β ⋅ +
β ⋅ + β ⋅ + β ⋅ + β ⋅




i t i t i t
i t t i i t
STAN DES DIVER DEBT
SIZE
+ β ⋅ + β ⋅ + β ⋅ +
β + ψ + η + ε
 
(2)
Equations are estimated using a panel data methodology, applying the System GMM 
technique (Arellano, Bover 1995; Blundell, Bond 1998). This methodology makes it 
possible to control, first, for individual heterogeneity, introducing an individual effect, 
ηi (Himmelberg et al. 1999) and, second, for macroeconomic effect on the dependent 
variable using time dummy variables. In addition, System GMM estimation solves the 
endogeneity problem with the estimation of a system of two simultaneous equations, 
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one equation in levels (with lagged first differences instruments) and the other in first 
differences (with lagged level instruments). We used lagged variables from three years 
(in levels or first differences, as appropriate) as instruments to control for the persistence 
over time of the variables relating to the board of directors and ownership. 
3. Results
Table 2 shows the effect of gender within the board of directors on the compensation 
design, independently of the role that the women play in the board. First, we analyse 
the influence of the female presence on the board on the variable pay of the executive 
director (Model 1). As predicts Hypothesis 1, the results show a positive and significant 
effect of the percentage of women on the board of directors on the variable pay of the 
executive directors. Focusing on economical significance, an increase of 5.7% in the 
percentage of women on the board of directors implies an estimated increase of 67.8% 
in the percentage of variable pay.
Table 2. System GMM Estimation of the influence of female directors on the logarithm 
transformation of fraction of variable based pay
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Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
F 1598.58*** 1430.81*** 1121.12***
z1 0.000 0.000 0.000
z2 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 –0.70 –0.72 –0.72
Sargan 68.55(307) 69.28(307) 72.27(307)
Notes: *, **, *** Significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively; VARIABLES: PER_ WOM_BOA 
(percentage of women on the board of directors), BLAU (Blau diversity index), SHANNON (Shan-
non diversity index), PER_ EXT_DIR (percentage of external directors on the board), DUAL (binary 
variable that takes a value of 1 when the same person occupies the roles of CEO and Chairman of the 
board and 0 otherwise), NUM_DIR (number of directors on the board), NUM_MEE (number of meet-
ings held annually by the compensation committee), OWN_FIV_SHA (the sum of ownership for the 
top five shareholders), FAM_DUM (binary variable that takes a value of 1 when the main shareholder 
is an individual/family member and zero otherwise), COR_DUM (binary variable that takes a value 
of 1 when the main shareholder is a corporation and zero otherwise), TOBIN_Q (approximation of 
Tobin’s Q calculated as total debt plus market value of equity divided by total assets), ROA (return on 
equity), STAN_DES (standard deviation of market return), DIVER (firm diversification, calculated and 
the number of different secondary SIC codes). DEBT (debt ratio calculated as total debt divided by 
total assets), SIZE (firm size, measured as the logarithm of total assets), F statistic (test of combined 
significance); Hausman (Hausman specification test), z1 and z2 are two Wald tests of the joint signifi-
cance of the reported coefficients and the joint significance of the time dummy variables, respectively 
(asymptotically distributed as l2 under the null hypothesis of no relationship, probability is shown); m2 
is a second-order serial correlation test using residuals in first differences, asymptotically distributed 
as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation; Sargan is a test of the over-identifying 
restrictions, asymptotically distributed as l2 under the null hypothesis of no correlation between the 
instruments and the error term, degrees of freedom in parentheses.
Models 2 and 3 include the Shannon and Blau diversity indexes. As discussed above, 
these variables show their maximum value when there are equal numbers of men and 
women on the board. The figures obtained confirm the positive effect of gender diversity 
on the variable pay. An increase of 0.095 in the Blau diversity index, which is equal 
to its mean value, implies an estimated increase of 67.9% of the percentage of vari-
able pay and an increase of 0.159 in the Shannon diversity index, which is equal to its 
mean value, implies an estimated increase of 70.1% in the percentage of variable pay. 
End of Table 2
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Therefore the diversity of gender in the board leads to a more appropriate compensation 
design, with a greater percentage of the compensation linked to firm results as predicts 
Hypothesis 1. Similar results were previously obtained by Adams and Ferreira, but in a 
different institutional context. This may reduce agency conflicts, as Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) and Bear et al. (2010) argue. These results based on three different measures of 
gender diversity allow accept Hypothesis 1, that is, gender diversity in the compensation 
of the board of directors leads to a greater proportion of executive directors’ compensa-
tion linked to performance. 
In Table 3, we examine Hypothesis 1 considering the presence of women in the role 
of independent and Hypothesis 2 where we test the moderating role of the ownership 
concentration. In Models 1 and 2 we present the results obtained when considering the 
role of female board members through the percentage of female independent directors 
on the board and the number of female board members on the compensation committee, 
respectively. Furthermore, Models 3 and 4 takes into account ownership concentration 
interactively to test Hypothesis 2. As can be seen in Model 1, there is a positive and 
highly significant effect of the percentage of female independent directors and this 
coefficient is larger than the coefficient of the effect of the percentage of female direc-
tors obtained in Table 2. Focusing on economical significance, an increase of 2.4% in 
the percentage of independent women implies an estimated increase of 60.3% in the 
percentage of executive directors’ variable pay. Therefore, the independent female pres-
ence on the board not only increases the amount of variable pay received by executive 
directors reducing, at the same time, the amount of fixed pay. It supports the conclusion 
that their role on the board conditions their supervisory activities. We accept Hypothesis 
1 when we consider the presence of women in the role of independents.
Also, the number of female board members on the compensation committee is positive 
and significant (Model 2). In this case, an increase of 0.24 in the number of female 
board members on the compensation committee implies an estimated increase of 55.8% 
in the percentage of executive directors’ variable pay. Thus, the presence of women pro-
motes the diversity of approaches and increases the effectiveness of the compensation 
committee. Based on this argument, the female board members may exercise greater 
supervisory activities through compensation committee meetings and the compensation 
design is discussed and studied from different perspectives. This evidence supports 
previous findings on the role of heterogeneous groups in reducing agency costs and 
establishing a fair compensation system. Thus, the incorporation of women onto boards 
not only promotes gender equality, but increases the effectiveness of this mechanism by 
creating diversity in the decision-making process.
Models 3 and 4 report estimations of Equation 2, considering the differing impact of the 
percentage of independent female directors and the number of female board members, 
and linking this with ownership concentration. As predicts Hypothesis 2, the results 
show a significant negative effect on the executive directors’ variable pay of the product 
of the percentage of independent female board members and ownership concentra-
tion (Model 3). The same result is obtained for the product of the number of female 
board members on the compensation committee and ownership concentration (Model 4). 
1147
Journal of Business Economics and Management, 2016, 17(6): 1133–1154
Table 3. System GMM Estimation of the influence of female directors on the logarithm 
transformation of fraction of variable based pay
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The economical significance is smaller when ownership concentration increases. In 
companies with a mean ownership concentration, an increase of 2.4% in the percent-
age of independent women implies an estimated increase of 30.1% in the percentage of 
executive directors’ variable pay and an increase of 0.24 in the number of female board 
members on the compensation committee implies an estimated increase of 43.6% in the 
percentage of variable pay.
The evidence obtained of a negative marginal effect implies that a proper compensation 
system, encouraged by the presence of females on the board as independent members 
or on the compensation committee, is reduced by the existence of a few dominant 
shareholders. As expected, ownership concentration reduces the positive relationship 
between the presence of the woman and executive directors’ compensation linked to 
firm performance (Hypothesis 2). Also when the main shareholder is an individual/fam-

















Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
F 1601.85*** 422.35*** 2145.31*** 1010.51***
z1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
z2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 –0.79 –0.94 –1.00 –0.76
Sargan 74.60 (307) 68.25(307) 63.15(317) 62.89(304)
Notes: *, **, *** Significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively; Chi2: test of combined significance; 
VARIABLES: PER_IND_WOM (percentage of female independent board members), OWN_FIV_
SHA (the sum of ownership for the top five shareholders), NUM_WOM_MEE (number of female 
board members on the compensation committee), PER_ EXT_DIR (percentage of external directors 
on the board), DUAL (binary variable that takes a value of 1 when the same person occupies the roles 
of CEO and Chairman of the board and 0 otherwise), NUM_DIR (number of directors on the board), 
NUM_MEE (number of meetings held annually by the compensation committee), FAM_DUM (binary 
variable that takes a value of 1 when the main shareholder is an individual/family member and zero 
otherwise), COR_DUM (binary variable that takes a value of 1 when the main shareholder is a corpo-
ration and zero otherwise), TOBIN_Q (approximation of Tobin’s Q calculated as total debt plus market 
value of equity divided by total assets), ROA (return on equity), STAN_DES (standard deviation of 
market return), DIVER (firm diversification, calculated and the number of different secondary SIC 
codes). DEBT (debt ratio calculated as total debt divided by total assets), SIZE (firm size, measured 
as the logarithm of total assets), F statistic (test of combined significance); Hausman (Hausman speci-
fication test), z1 and z2 are two Wald tests of the joint significance of the reported coefficients and the 
joint significance of the time dummy variables, respectively (asymptotically distributed as l2 under 
the null hypothesis of no relationship, probability is shown); m2 is a second-order serial correlation 
test using residuals in first differences, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis 
of no serial correlation; Sargan is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed 
as l2 under the null hypothesis of no correlation between the instruments and the error term, degrees 
of freedom in parentheses.
End of Table 3
1149
Journal of Business Economics and Management, 2016, 17(6): 1133–1154
ily the positive relationship is smaller as a consequence of ineffective internal controls 
while if the main shareholder is a company the relationship is larger as a consequence 
of internal control quality. Therefore, we accept Hypothesis 2 which states that owner-
ship concentration reduce the positive links between independent women on the board 
and executive directors’ compensation linked to firm performance.
Conclusions and discussion
This paper starts from the premise that one of the ways in which boards of directors 
can have a positive influence in business is through the increasing of the presence of 
independent women directors. Board diversity can have a significant impact on the 
improvement of executive monitoring by way of the design of an appropriate com-
pensation system linked to performance, which orients their decision-making towards 
maximising the value of the firm. Additionally, this paper add new evidences in the field 
by considering a particular context of corporate governance, the Spanish one, where 
the role of executive directors is most relevant in comparison with the Anglo-Saxon 
context as a consequence of the high level of ownership concentration in a few majority 
shareholders who usually act as a executives as well. 
Using panel data methodology for all the companies listed on the Spanish stock market 
during the period 2004–2011, we find a positive and significant influence in the rela-
tion among gender diversity on the board, effectiveness of monitoring, and pay-for-
performance. Specifically, the results show a positive and highly significant effect of the 
percentage of female independent directors on the proportion of executive directors’ var-
iable pay. Our findings also show that the number of female board members on the com-
pensation committee influences the variable pay positively. The greater variety of skills, 
knowledge, and attitudes which with women contribute to improve the boards’ decision 
making also drive to better information about and evaluation of executives favouring 
the establishment of pay packages more closely linked to firm performance. These 
characteristics of women, influencing gender diversity in terms of independent women 
on the board, may compensate the low monitoring effectiveness of Spanish boards. 
Additionally, our findings contribute to highlight the moderating role of ownership 
structure in the relationships between board diversity and executive directors’ compen-
sation. Although previous empirical evidence generally supports that when ownership 
is concentrated executives are better monitored and the compensation they received is 
more closely linked to company performance, this expected effect may change depend-
ing on the context of corporate governance. In Spanish listed companies we can find 
many companies controlled by majority internal shareholders (firms, individuals, and/
or families), who combine the roles of executives with that of directors on the board. 
The controlling shareholder serves as “entrenched” executive, with sufficient ownership 
to control the board. In this framework, the presence of independent women directors 
on the board balance the low monitoring effectiveness of firms controlled by internal 
majority shareholders. 
In that vein, our results show a significant and negative effect on the executive directors’ 
variable pay of interaction between the proportion of independent female directors on 
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the board and ownership concentration – obtaining the same result for the number of 
female board members on the compensation committee. The evidence obtained implies 
that a proper executives’ compensation system, encouraged by the presence of females 
on the board as independent members or on the compensation committee, is reduced by 
the existence of a few dominant shareholders. As we expected, the high level of own-
ership concentration in Spanish listed firms that reduces the effectiveness of corporate 
governance, also diminishes the positive relationship between the presence of women 
and executive directors’ compensation linked to firm performance.
Hence, we can interpret these results in the Spanish context, as evidence of the pos-
sible existence of a certain underestimation of women’s skills as well as discrimination 
based on the stereotypes and social and institutional prejudices on boards of companies 
mostly dominated by majority internal shareholders, most of them men. In spite of all 
the measures taken to promote gender equality in large Spanish firms, the data show 
that there is still much to be done. While it is true that the percentage of female direc-
tors has risen from 2% in the year 2004 to 9 % in 2009, the percentage achieved is still 
a long way from the objective of 40% established by the Spanish Government for the 
year 2015. Furthermore, the abovementioned law does not apply to small and medium-
sized firms which representing the majority of the Spanish businesses and employment. 
The majority of previous studies and this present one indicate that gender equality is 
advisable not only from the point of view of social justice but also in economic terms. 
Thus the implementation of legislation on equality and the broadening of its application 
to the firms to which it currently does not apply is advisable. 
Therefore, the implications of this study go in the direction of the reform of the compo-
sition of boards, and the introduction of gender diversity could be the first step towards 
the improved control and effectiveness of companies. Firstly, diversity could help to 
establish compensation packages more related to firm performance, which would reduce 
agency costs and promote a better image for the management of the firm, its effective-
ness and functioning. Secondly, firms should not only take into account that gender 
diversity helps to make them socially responsible, with a view to complying with equal-
ity legislation and to improving their corporate image, but that increasing diversity on 
boards can also help them take better corporate decisions, with a resulting increase in 
firm value. Similarly, if, for whatever reason, a board lacks the characteristics which 
would promote greater monitoring and effectiveness, the existence of diversity could 
substitute for them in this absence. 
Finally, with regard to the limitations, one of the major ones was related to the lack of 
detailed information of firms’ corporate governance reports concerning executives’ com-
pensation. It would be interesting to carry out additional studies considering the whole 
top management team, distinguishing between directors and non-director executives. 
Additionally, a similar analysis that took into account whether gender diversity among 
different types of firm’s owners has a significant effect on executives’ compensation 
would be interesting in future studies. Lastly, it is necessary to look deeply insight into 
the factors influencing the presence of women on the board considering additional views 
from social and psychological traditions.
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